Some files carry a signed record of where they came from: which tool or model produced them, what edits happened, and who signed the claim. This page reads that record, checks the signature against the C2PA trust list and reports one of five outcomes — verified, valid but untrusted, invalid, unreadable, or absent. The file stays on your device: only the trust list, which we host ourselves, is fetched.
Manifest
Read locally
Signature
Verified on device
Needs account
No
A C2PA manifest is a CBOR assertion store signed with a certificate. It is not one field but a small document, and different tools fill it differently. These are the parts worth reading.
A valid signature proves that the file has not changed since it was signed, and that the signer holds a certificate. It does not prove the photo is real, the date is honest, or the person named actually took it. Signing tools sign whatever they are given.
In practice the action list and the declared digital source type are what answer the question people actually ask: was this produced or edited by an AI tool, and if so which one. A manifest that says trainedAlgorithmicMedia is the tool admitting it. A manifest that says digitalCapture is a camera app saying it did not.
Most online verifiers upload your file to their servers. Verification also needs a trust list, which is a network request — in this case to our own origin, for a 70 KB PEM bundle we host, not to a third party and never with your file. If that bundle cannot be fetched, the result degrades to “manifest found, not verified” rather than guessing.
Most cameras, editors and generators write nothing. Most platforms strip what was written. An empty result is what a file that travelled through the open web usually looks like, so it cannot be treated as evidence of anything.
Drop a photo, video or PDF into the panel. The manifest is parsed and the signature checked locally in WASM; the file never leaves the page.
Read the verdict first — verified, valid but untrusted, or invalid — then the claims behind it: generator, signer certificate, declared actions and digital source type.
Check the ordinary metadata evidence further down. If you want the claims gone, open the matching remover.
Before you rely on it
A C2PA manifest is metadata: it can be read, and it can be removed. An invisible watermark such as SynthID is embedded in the pixels and is designed to survive re-encoding. This tool cannot detect or remove one, and it will not claim that a file without a manifest is free of them.
Content Credentials is the marketing name for C2PA: an open specification for attaching a signed, tamper-evident provenance record to a file. The record is stored inside the file as a CBOR assertion store wrapped in JUMBF, with a signature over the claim.
Yes. The claim signature is checked against the signing certificate, the asset hash recorded at signing time is compared with the bytes you dropped, and the certificate chain is checked against the C2PA trust list. The result is one of three outcomes — verified, valid but untrusted, or invalid — and the codes behind it are listed so you can judge for yourself.
No. It means the signature checks out and the file still matches what was signed, but the signing certificate is not on the C2PA trust list. Tooling frequently signs before enrolling, and some certificates are missing the extended key usage C2PA expects. Treat it as “the signer is not accredited”, not as a forgery.
Unknown, and this tool will not guess. Most generators never write a manifest, and most platforms remove metadata on upload. “No signature found” only describes this copy of this file.
Sometimes. The claim generator field often names the tool and version, and some tools add an assertion naming the model. It is whatever the tool chose to write — a manifest without it says nothing about the model.
No. The manifest is parsed by a WASM module running in your browser. The only request is for that module, which comes from this site. Open the network panel and check: no request carries your file.